

OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL



**PHYSICAL SECURITY AT THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION**

**-- WARNING --
THIS REPORT CONTAINS RESTRICTED
INFORMATION FOR OFFICIAL USE.
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO AUTHORIZED
OFFICIALS.**

James G. Huse, Jr. – ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL

January 1999

A-13-97-01028

Mission

We improve SSA programs and operations and protect them against fraud, waste, and abuse by conducting independent and objective audits, evaluations, and investigations. We provide timely, useful, and reliable information and advice to Administration officials, the Congress, and the public.

Authority

The Inspector General Act created independent audit and investigative units, called the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The mission of the OIG, as spelled out in the Act, is to:

- Conduct and supervise independent and objective audits and investigations relating to agency programs and operations.**
- Promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the agency.**
- Prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in agency programs and operations.**
- Review and make recommendations regarding existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to agency programs and operations.**
- Keep the agency head and the Congress fully and currently informed of problems in agency programs and operations.**

To ensure objectivity, the IG Act empowers the IG with:

- Independence to determine what reviews to perform.**
- Access to all information necessary for the reviews.**
- Authority to publish findings and recommendations based on the reviews.**

Vision

By conducting independent and objective audits, investigations, and evaluations, we are agents of positive change striving for continuous improvement in the Social Security Administration's programs, operations, and management and in our own office.



SOCIAL SECURITY
Office of the Inspector General

MEMORANDUM

Date: JAN - 6 1999

Refer To:

To: Kenneth S. Apfel
Commissioner of Social Security

From: Acting Inspector General

Subject: Physical Security at the Social Security Administration

Attached is a copy of our final report entitled, "Physical Security at the Social Security Administration" (A-13-97-01028). The objective of our audit was to determine whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) implemented the Counter Technology Incorporated's physical security recommendations to help ensure adequate physical security at all SSA field offices.

THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT IS SENSITIVE AND CONFIDENTIAL. FOR SECURITY REASONS WE RECOMMEND THAT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS REPORT BE LIMITED TO THOSE WITH A NEED TO KNOW.

You may wish to comment on any further action taken or contemplated on our recommendations. If you choose to offer comments, please provide them within the next 60 days. If you wish to discuss the final report, please call me or have your staff contact Daniel R. Devlin, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audit, at (410) 965-9700.



James G. Huse, Jr.

Attachment

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT IS SENSITIVE AND CONFIDENTIAL. FOR SECURITY REASONS WE RECOMMEND THAT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS REPORT BE LIMITED TO THOSE WITH A NEED TO KNOW.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Social Security Administration (SSA) implemented the Counter Technology Incorporated's (CTI) physical security recommendations to ensure adequate physical security at all SSA field offices (FO).

BACKGROUND

Security concerns have increased in recent years, especially since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. During the same year, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a report recommending minimum security standards for Federal facilities as directed by the President of the United States in Executive Order (EO) 12977.

In 1995, SSA contracted with CTI to perform a physical security review and evaluation of SSA facilities nationwide. This review was an important part of SSA's compliance with the EO. CTI conducted surveys of over 1,000 SSA FOs. The CTI review did not cover executive protection, computer system security, SSA Headquarters complex, the National Computer Center (NCC), or Headquarters Office of Protective Security Services (OPSS) operations. The contractor's reports, released to SSA Headquarters in October 1996, included 15,867 recommendations to improve physical security in SSA FOs. The recommendations included, but were not limited to, adding duress alarms, peepholes, locks, intrusion detection systems, lighting, power back-up, physical barriers, and physical modifications. In April 1997, SSA provided \$8.5 million in funding and issued instructions to FOs to implement CTI's recommendations. Release of the reports to FO managers occurred after the managers signed confidentiality statements to ensure the security of the contents of each report.

We judgmentally selected sites with the largest number of CTI recommendations in SSA's 10 regions. Starting in March 1998, we visited a total of 39 offices including: 8 Offices of Hearings and Appeals, 22 FOs, 4 regional/program service centers (PSC), and 5 Teleservice Centers (TSC) (see Appendix C). At the facilities, we conducted

interviews, toured the facilities, and analyzed CTI's security reports and recommendations to verify implementation of recommendations. Fieldwork was conducted between November 1997 and April 1998.

We issued an early alert to the Acting Deputy Commissioner for Finance, Assessment and Management in March 1998 (see Appendix A) concerning problems with the implementation of CTI's recommendations. The alert was the result of an initial sample of four FOs. We found that recommendations were not implemented because of communication problems. We recommended that SSA implement all appropriate CTI recommendations. In a response on May 26, 1998 (see Appendix B), SSA agreed with our findings and indicated that appropriate corrective action was underway. SSA further stated that "... optimum physical security at all SSA offices continues to be of great importance and a high priority."

RESULTS OF REVIEW

- RECOMMENDATIONS WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
- SOME RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY CTI WERE INAPPROPRIATE
- OFFICE MANAGERS BELIEVED THAT CTI OVERLOOKED NEEDED SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We reviewed 568 CTI recommendations: 269 (47 percent) were implemented; 62 (11 percent) were pending implementation; 113 (20 percent) were not implemented; and 124 (22 percent) were inappropriate. SSA processes were not sufficient to: (1) verify implementation of the recommendations, (2) provide an opportunity for managers to discuss the validity of the recommendations with CTI, or (3) provide an opportunity to discuss improvements identified by the office managers that may have optimized security.

We recommend that SSA:

- verify implementation of all CTI recommendations on a timely basis;
- ensure that all unimplemented CTI recommendations that should be implemented are addressed;
- determine the appropriateness of additional security measures identified by office managers and ensure implementation of those determined to be appropriate; and

- require appropriate exit conferences with contractors in connection with future security reviews to ensure that the reviews are comprehensive and that the recommendations are appropriate.

AGENCY COMMENTS

SSA agreed with our recommendations and is taking action to implement them. The Agency has retained the services of a professional security contractor to conduct follow-up reviews of 75 offices previously surveyed by CTI, and its own security specialists recently completed a review of an additional 25 offices. The purpose of these follow-up visits is to verify implementation of appropriate CTI recommendations. Based on the information provided in our report, along with security contractor's and its own findings, the Agency will conduct additional monitoring of the implementation of security recommendations (See Appendix D).

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INTRODUCTION

THIS REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT IS SENSITIVE AND CONFIDENTIAL. FOR SECURITY REASONS WE RECOMMEND THAT DISTRIBUTION OF THIS REPORT BE LIMITED TO THOSE WITH A NEED TO KNOW.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this audit was to determine whether SSA implemented CTI's physical security recommendations to ensure adequate physical security at all SSA FOs.

BACKGROUND

Security concerns have increased in recent years, especially since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. During the same year, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a report recommending minimum security standards for Federal facilities. The President of the United States directed each Federal facility to implement these standards.

The General Services Administration (GSA) and SSA share responsibility for the security of SSA property.¹ GSA is responsible for providing and coordinating security protection services for SSA leased and Federally owned facilities nationwide. The degree of protection beyond standard levels required by SSA is determined jointly by GSA and SSA. After conducting appropriate security and crime prevention assessments, the level of special protection is determined on a facility-by-facility basis.

Within SSA's Office of Facilities Management, OPSS is the Headquarters unit responsible for security programs guidance, instructions, policy, and periodic evaluation of physical security at SSA offices nationwide. OPSS disseminates its security instructions through a series of written guidelines incorporated in SSA's Administrative Instructions Manual System. OPSS also conducts physical security reviews of SSA facilities on a periodic basis. The purpose of these reviews is to evaluate overall trends in security awareness, to train staff, and to identify physical security weaknesses.

¹ 41 Code of Federal Regulations 101-20.103.1-2.

CTI Contract

In 1995, SSA contracted with CTI to perform a physical security review and evaluation of SSA facilities nationwide. This review was an important part of SSA's compliance with the EO. CTI conducted surveys of over 1,000 SSA FOs. The CTI review did not cover executive protection, computer system security, SSA Headquarters complex, the NCC, or OPSS operations. The contractor's reports, released to SSA Headquarters in October 1996, included 15,867 recommendations to improve physical security in SSA FOs. The recommendations included, but were not limited to, adding duress alarms, peepholes, locks, intrusion detection systems, lighting, power back-up, physical barriers, and physical modifications. In April 1997, SSA provided \$8.5 million in funding to FOs and issued instructions to implement CTI's recommendations. Release of the reports to FO managers occurred after the managers signed confidentiality statements to ensure security of the contents of each report.

OPSS is monitoring the implementation of CTI's recommendations by requiring each FO to complete a form indicating the status of implementing CTI's recommendations. This information is being entered into a data base. Although SSA expected most offices to complete implementation of CTI's recommendations by December 1997, many recommendations were still pending implementation when our fieldwork was completed in April 1998. SSA did not set a due date for completion.

We issued an early alert to the Acting Deputy Commissioner for Finance, Assessment and Management in March 1998 (see Appendix A) concerning problems with the implementation of CTI's recommendations. The alert was the result of an initial sample of four FOs. We found that recommendations were not implemented because of communication problems. We recommended that SSA implement all appropriate recommendations. In its response on May 26, 1998 (see Appendix B), SSA agreed with our findings and indicated that appropriate corrective action is underway. SSA further stated that optimum physical security at all SSA offices continues to be of great importance and a high priority.


SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We judgmentally selected sites with the largest number of CTI recommendations from SSA's 10 regions. We visited a total of 39 offices including 8 Offices of Hearings and Appeals, 22 FOs, 4 regional/PSCs, and 5 TSCs (see Appendix C). We reviewed Federal regulations, interviewed security personnel and office managers, toured SSA facilities, and analyzed CTI's security reports and recommendations to verify implementation of recommendations. We conducted the fieldwork between November 1997 and April 1998. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

RESULTS OF REVIEW

We reviewed 568 CTI recommendations: 269 (47 percent) were implemented; 62 (11 percent) were pending implementation; 113 (20 percent) were not implemented;² and 124 (22 percent) were inappropriate. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1



RECOMMENDATIONS WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED BUT SHOULD HAVE BEEN

Our interviews revealed that managers abandoned recommendations even though the reasons given for not implementing them were questionable. For example, we found:

- informational problems, e.g., managers not knowing what and/or how to implement the recommendation(s); and
- reliance on other entities to implement the recommendation(s); e.g., failure to pursue the approval or support of landlords, GSA, and/or the local government.

Managers also cited funding problems as reasons for not implementing recommendations. For example, some of the funding problems managers cited included: assuming that funds were not available (even though documentation we

² Subsequent to an exit conference on July 27, 1998, SSA officials informed us that they had contacted the managers of the FOs included in the Office of the Inspector General audit to determine the status of unimplemented recommendations. The SSA officials informed us that, as of August 19, 1998, only 45 of the 113 recommendations remained unimplemented.

reviewed indicated that funding was available); believing no one was willing to pay for the changes; believing there was no ongoing funding; and not wanting to ask for additional funds.

As a result of our on-site visits, we developed a list of unimplemented recommendations. At the request of SSA management, we supplied the list to SSA's OPSS, who contacted office managers as well as regional office personnel to determine why the recommendations were not implemented. We reviewed the results of OPSS' analysis and the reasons given by managers for not implementing certain recommendations. We determined that 113 (20 percent) unimplemented recommendations should have been implemented. Some examples of these recommendations include:

- Installing large planters to prevent vehicles from entering certain approaches to the building;
- Installing intrusion detection systems;
- Installing locks on restroom doors;
- Securing elevators and stairwells;
- Installing windows or peepholes on doors;
- Securing reception windows;
- Installing smoke detectors; and
- Installing sufficient exterior lighting.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY CTI WERE INAPPROPRIATE

During our site visits, office managers identified inappropriate recommendations made by CTI. SSA management instructed office managers that a number of CTI recommendations might be inappropriate for small offices, i.e., requiring visitors to sign in and present positive identification; escorting visitors through the office; incorporating blast standards in new construction and renovation plans; and installing Mylar film on windows. SSA management also gave instructions that decisions on other types of recommendations should be made on a case-by-case basis. Office managers found that some recommendations were inappropriate because they were dangerous or inapplicable. Our review found that 124 recommendations were inappropriate. Some examples are: -

- placing a gas meter inside a particular office when the local gas company said it was dangerous and advised against it;
- installing costly items when a move is anticipated within a short period of time;
- installing tamper proof hinges when they already exist;
- creating a front-end interviewing area when there is no space for one; and

- installing cipher locks on rest room doors even though the rest rooms are shared with the public and other tenants.

The contractors did not provide the office managers a formal opportunity to comment on the security weaknesses and any preliminary or final recommendations to help ensure their validity. The contract did not have a provision requiring an exit interview with the office managers. We assume that contracted personnel would have been able to respond to the necessity of the security measures being suggested while being on-site. We believe that affording an opportunity for both office management and internal security personnel to comment on recommendations (perhaps through a forum such as an exit conference) would have precluded some of the inappropriate recommendations. This would have alleviated work performed by OPSS in collecting information on these inappropriate recommendations.

OFFICE MANAGERS BELIEVED THAT CTI OVERLOOKED NEEDED SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

Office managers reported that security for their work areas could be improved beyond what CTI recommended. Our interviews disclosed that CTI overlooked such additional security measures as:

- needing a way to get out of the office in case of an emergency;
- installing devices such as peepholes, buzzers, electronic entrance gates, automatic door closers (when hands are not free to shut the door), having a universal guest badge, and adding a sprinkler system;
- training employees to identify and handle difficult or emotionally/psychologically unstable individuals; and
- adding building patrols and camera monitoring.

CTI staff should have provided office managers an opportunity to identify these additional security concerns. We believe an exit conference would have provided this opportunity.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We reviewed 568 CTI recommendations: 269 (47 percent) were implemented; 62 (11 percent) were pending implementation; 113 (20 percent) were not implemented; and 124 (22 percent) were inappropriate. SSA processes were not sufficient to: (1) verify implementation of the recommendations, (2) provide an opportunity for managers to discuss the validity of the recommendations with CTI, or (3) provide an opportunity to discuss improvements identified by the office managers that may have optimized security.

We recommend that SSA:

1. verify implementation of all CTI recommendations on a timely basis;
2. ensure that all unimplemented CTI recommendations that should be implemented are addressed;
3. determine the appropriateness of additional security measures identified by office managers and ensure implementation of those determined to be appropriate; and
4. require appropriate exit conferences with contractors in connection with future security reviews to ensure that the reviews are comprehensive and that the recommendations are appropriate.

AGENCY COMMENTS

SSA agreed with our recommendations and is taking action to implement them. The Agency has retained the services of a professional security contractor to conduct follow-up reviews of 75 offices previously surveyed by CTI, and its own security specialists recently completed a review of an additional 25 offices. The purpose of these follow-up visits is to verify implementation of CTI's recommendations. Based on the information provided in our report, along with security contractor's and its own findings, the Agency will conduct additional monitoring of the implementation of security recommendations (See Appendix D).

APPENDICES

**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL MEMORANDUM DATED
MARCH 2, 1998**



SOCIAL SECURITY
Office of the Inspector General

MEMORANDUM

Date: March 2, 1998
To: Dale W. Sopper
Acting Deputy Commissioner for
Finance, Assessment and Management

Refer To:

From: Inspector General

Subject: Physical Security at the Social Security Administration -- **CONFIDENTIAL**

This is to alert you to our concerns, identified as a result of a probe sample conducted as part of an Office of the Inspector General audit,¹ about the Social Security Administration's (SSA) implementation of physical security enhancements. A full report of our findings will be provided in our final audit report later this year.

BACKGROUND

Responsibility for security is shared by General Services Administration (GSA) and SSA (41 Code of Federal Regulations 101-20.103.1-2). GSA is responsible for providing and coordinating security protection services for SSA leased and federally owned facilities nationwide. The degree of protection beyond standard levels required by SSA is determined jointly by GSA and SSA. The level of special protection is determined on a facility-by-facility basis, after conducting appropriate security and crime prevention assessments.

Security concerns have grown in recent years especially since the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. That same year the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued its report entitled "Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities." The report recommended minimum security standards. President Clinton adopted the recommendations and directed each Federal facility to upgrade the minimum security standards recommended by the DOJ study.

SSA contracted Counter Technology Incorporated (CTI), in 1995, to perform a physical security review and evaluation of SSA facilities nationwide. CTI conducted surveys of more than 1,300 SSA field offices (FO) and reviewed SSA's Administrative Instructions Manual System (AIMS) regarding security. The CTI review did not cover executive protection, computer system security, SSA Headquarters complex, National Computer Center, or Headquarters Office of Protective Security Services (OPSS) operations. The contractor

¹ "Physical Security at the Social Security Administration" (A-13-97-01028).

provided over 15,000 recommendations, costing an estimated \$21.6 million, to enhance the Agency's physical security program. SSA instructed the offices on the implementation of the CTI recommendations and provided funding in April 1997.

The Office of Facilities Management, OPSS is the Headquarters unit responsible for security programs guidance, instructions, policy and periodic evaluation of physical security at SSA offices nationwide. OPSS disseminates its security guidelines through a series of written guidelines incorporated in AIMS. OPSS also conducts physical security reviews of SSA facilities on a periodic basis. The purpose of these reviews is to evaluate overall trends in security awareness, training, and physical security weaknesses.

OPSS is monitoring the implementation of CTI recommendations by requiring each FO to complete a form indicating the implementation status of the CTI recommendations. This information is being entered into a data base. SSA expected most offices to complete implementation of the CTI recommendations by December 1997.

SCOPE

The objective of our review is to determine whether the CTI recommendations were implemented. A probe sample review was conducted during November and December 1997. We visited four SSA offices. These offices were selected for their close proximity to SSA Headquarters, Baltimore, and because each had a large number of recommendations for security enhancements. The offices included an Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) facility, two FOs, and a Regional (RO)/Program Service Center office. We interviewed the office managers, toured each facility, and observed operations at each location.

RESULTS OF PROBE SAMPLE

We found that significant physical security recommendations have not been implemented due to: (1) communication problems and (2) confidentiality statement problems.

Communication Problems

The OHA office selected for our probe sample had 15 CTI recommendations. The office manager said that six recommendations, involving funding, were not implemented because the RO did not instruct them to proceed with the implementation of the CTI recommendations. Our further inquiry with the OHA RO indicated that there had been a communication problem and none of the Region III OHA offices were instructed to proceed with the implementation of the recommendations. Our review of the OPSS data base showed that 14 OHA offices in Region III were given a total of 76 significant physical security recommendations including: duress alarms, peepholes, locks, intrusion detection systems, lighting, power back-up, physical barriers, and physical modifications. As a result of the failure to notify the offices to proce

with implementing the recommendations, unnecessary delays were incurred in providing necessary security enhancements. We believe that SSA should immediately instruct the Region III OHA offices to begin implementing the CTI recommendations.

Confidentiality Statement Problems

In the course of selecting probe sites, we discovered that one site selected had not implemented the CTI recommendations because the confidentiality statement had not been signed by the office manager and returned to OPSS. We reviewed over 1,300 files located at OPSS and were not able to find signed confidentiality statements for 33 offices (2.5 percent). The confidentiality statement certifies that the office manager will keep the CTI survey reports in a safe place and not make copies. The statement was required to be signed before OPSS would send the CTI reports to those offices to begin implementing recommendations. We contacted the office managers for all 33 offices to determine if they submitted a signed statement, received the CTI survey report, and implemented the recommendations.

Twenty-three of 33 office managers said that they did not receive the CTI report and therefore, did not implement the CTI recommendations. The 23 offices had a total of 74 significant recommendations including: duress alarms, peepholes, locks, intrusion detection systems, lighting, power back-up, physical barriers, and physical modifications.

Thirteen of the 23 office managers said they sent a signed confidentiality statement to the RO. Nine of the 13 office managers were able to provide us with a copy of the signed statement. We do not know why those statements were not in OPSS files.

Ten of the 23 office managers said that they did not submit a signed confidentiality statement. Four of the 10 office managers said that the office was moving and, therefore, did not need the CTI report. Two office managers said they never received the confidentiality statement from central office and two said they did not remember why they did not submit the statement. One office manager said he was waiting for further instructions, and one office manager said she would remit the statement as soon as possible.

The remaining 10 office managers said that they received the CTI report and are implementing the recommendations. Nine of the 10 office managers provided us with copies of the signed statement. Again, we do not know why the statements are not in the appropriate OPSS files.

All physical security recommendations should be implemented as quickly as possible. Those offices that have not submitted a confidentiality statement should be required to do so immediately so that the CTI recommendations can be sent to them. All offices should be reminded of the importance of implementing the recommendations pertaining to their offices.

Page 4 - Dale W. Sopper

CONFIDENTIAL

Please provide comments within 30 days concerning your plan to address the problems we have identified. If you have any questions, please call me or have your staff contact Pamela J. Gardiner, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, at extension 5-9700.

David C. Williams
David C. Williams

**RESPONSE MEMORANDUM DATED
MAY 26, 1998**



SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

Date: MAY 26 1998

Refer To: SIJ-3

To: Inspector General

From: Acting Deputy Commissioner
for Finance, Assessment and Management

Subject: Office of Inspector General Interim Report, "Physical Security at
the Social Security Administration (SSA)"--INFORMATION

Thank you for the interim report that communicates your probe results on implementation status of physical security recommendations. I agree that where recommended measures remain applicable, offices yet to comply should implement changes immediately. As you know, optimum physical security at all SSA offices continues to be of great importance and a high priority.

Your report concludes that significant physical security recommendations have not been implemented due to communication and Confidentiality Statement problems.

The report indicates the percentage of offices yet to implement the contractor recommended security measures had not:
1) submitted a Confidentiality Statement; 2) established a secure area to house the security report; or 3) received from the regional office a clear indication to proceed with implementing the recommendations.


Your report reflects that, as of December 1997, 33 offices had not submitted a Confidentiality Statement and, therefore, had not received their respective security reports. On March 13, the Office of Facilities Management (OFM) released a written request to the managers responsible for ensuring security measure implementation. The request asked for cooperation in obtaining outstanding documents so that security reports could be released to the remaining nine offices. By April 23, 1998, the remaining offices had submitted the required documents and OFM had released their reports.

Concerning communication problems in Region III's hearings offices, the Region, in response to your interim report, has acknowledged there was a problem and has informed us of actions taken and underway to rectify the situation. In addition,

Region III reports that one hearing office relocated; therefore, recommendations addressing physical aspects of security at this office are no longer applicable. However, new locations undergo a site security assessment to ensure the new environment has optimum physical security measures in place.

On April 10, OFM allocated FY 1998 funds to field offices and hearings offices for physical security enhancements and upgrades recommended by Counter Technology, Incorporated and Network Engineering, Incorporated that have not been implemented previously. The funds can also be used for additional security items as deemed necessary.

If you have any questions, please give me a call. Staff questions may be directed to Jackie Newton at 69187.



Dale W. Sopper

OFFICES REVIEWED

REGION	FIELD OFFICES	OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS	REGIONAL OFFICE/ PROGRAM SERVICE CENTER	TELESERVICE CENTER	TOTAL
1	Hyannis, MA Holyoke, MA Montpelier, VT	Manchester, NH Hartford, CT			5
2	Riverhead, NY Bridgetown, NJ Canarsie, NY Toms River, NJ	Syracuse NY			5
3	Caleroi, PA Salisbury, MD Washington, DC	Charlottesville, VA			4
4	Carrollton, GA Danville, KY	Tupelo, MS	Birmingham, AL	Tampa, FL	5
5	Ironwood, MI Alpena, MI	Milwaukee, WI	Chicago, IL	Cincinnati, OH	5
6	Bartlesville, OK Ardmore, OK Okmulgee, OK	McAlester, OK		New Orleans, LA	5
7-8	Davenport, IA St. George, UT	Saint Louis, MO	Kansas City, MO	Saint Louis, MO	5
9-10	San Diego, CA Downey, CA Coosbay, OR		Richmond, CA	Salinas, CA	5
TOTAL	22	8	4	5	39

SSA COMMENTS TO THE DRAFT REPORT



SOCIAL SECURITY

MEMORANDUM

Date: November 12, 1998

Refer To: S1RL1

To: James G. Huse, Jr.
Acting Inspector General

From: John R. Dyer *JRD*
Principal Deputy Commissioner

Subject: Response to Your Draft Audit on Implementation of Counter
Technology, Incorporated's (CTI) Recommendations--INFORMATION

We would like to thank you for bringing the findings of the Office of the Inspector General's security audit to our attention. We take the findings of your audit, as well as those conducted by contractors and staff of the Deputy Commissioner for Finance, Assessment and Management, very seriously.

Because providing a safe and secure work environment for SSA employees is one of our primary concerns, we have committed considerable funds to support security enhancements. We have also retained the services of a professional security contractor to conduct followup reviews of 75 offices previously surveyed by CTI; our own security specialists recently completed a review of an additional 25 offices. The purpose of these followup visits is to verify implementation of CTI's recommendations.

Based on the information you provided, along with the security contractor's and our own findings, we will prepare a stratified sampling and use it as the basis for additional monitoring of the implementation of security recommendations.

I am attaching a copy of the memorandum I sent to the Regional Commissioners and Regional Chief Administrative Law Judges reinforcing the importance of implementing appropriate security recommendations made for their offices. If you will note, I have requested a complete status report by the end of December.

Our security personnel, along with the General Services Administration, will continue to evaluate the security posture of SSA offices and implement recommendations based on those evaluations.

Thank you again for your report.

Attachment

MAJOR REPORT CONTRIBUTORS

Office of the Inspector General

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
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SSA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Social Security Administration



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Director, Financial Management Audits	1
Director, Program Audits (East)	1
Director, Program Audits (West)	1
Director, Program Audits (North)	1
Director, Management Audits and Technical Services	1
Issue Area Team Leaders	15
Total	<u>44</u>

Overview of the Office of the Inspector General

Office of Audit

The Office of Audit conducts comprehensive financial and performance audits of SSA's programs and makes recommendations to ensure that program objectives are achieved effectively and efficiently. Financial audits, required by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, assess whether SSA's financial statements fairly present the Agency's financial position, results of operations, and cash flow. Performance audits review the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of SSA's programs. The Office of Audit also conducts short-term management and program evaluations focused on issues of concern to SSA, the Congress, and the general public. Evaluations often focus on identifying and recommending ways to prevent and minimize program fraud and inefficiency.

Office of External Affairs

The Office of External Affairs has a twofold function--quality assurance and public affairs. The quality assurance team performs internal reviews to ensure that OIG offices nationwide hold themselves to the same rigorous standards that we expect from the Agency. The public affairs team communicates OIG's planned and current activities and their results to the Commissioner and the Congress as well as other entities.

Office of Investigations

The Office of Investigations conducts and coordinates investigative activity related to fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement of SSA programs and operations. This includes wrongdoing by applicants, beneficiaries, contractors, physicians, interpreters, representative payees, third parties, and by SSA employees in the performance of their duties. The Office of Investigations also conducts joint investigations with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

Office of Management Services

The Office of Management Services supports the OIG components by providing budget, procurement, telecommunications, facilities and equipment, human resources, information resources management, and systems security. The Office of Management Services also is responsible for and coordinates the OIG's strategic planning function and the development and implementation of performance measures required by the Government Performance and Results Act.

Counsel to the Inspector General

The Counsel to the Inspector General provides legal advice and counsel to the Inspector General on various matters, including: 1) statutes, regulations, legislation and policy directives governing the administration of SSA's programs; 2) investigative procedures and techniques; and 3) legal implications and conclusions to be drawn from audit and investigative material produced by the OIG. The Counsel's office also administers the civil monetary penalty program.